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NOTES
Real Parties in Interest Under the New Pennsylvania
Rules of Procedure
Heretofore, Pennsylvania has been one of the few states in which "to
use" actions were the accepted form of pleading. Rule 2002 of the new
Pennsylvania Rules of Procedure I introduces into Pennsylvania law real
party in interest practice, a practice which is now an important part of
the procedure of the majority of the states of this country 2 and of the
3
new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The adoption of the new rule5
4
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
by
act
enabling
Pennsylvania
the
under
is no doubt a culmination in Pennsylvania of a movement to follow the
advances made by other jurisdictions in the interest of a more simplified
i. For text of the rule see PA. RULES Civ. PRoc., Rule 2002, 332 Pa. lxxiii (939).
2. See explanatory note to Rule 2002, 332 Pa. lxxiv (1939).
3. Rule I7 (a) following 28 U. S. C. A. § 723c (Supp. 1939).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1940) tit. i7, § 61.
5. The new rule was adopted February 14, 1939, to become effective September 4,

1939.
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system of civil procedure. Even a cursory view of the new rules will
illustrate the desire of the Rules Committee to incorporate as far as possible provisions looking toward a less complicated procedure. The rule
itself is also intended to remove the confusion which undoubtedly would
have resulted from transferring a "use action" started in a state court to
a federal district court, which, under the new federal rules, requires the
action to be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.6
It has been apparent that actions by legal, but purely nominal, plaintiffs, while beneficial in some respects, made procedure clumsy and complicated beyond reason.7 The reform effected by the adoption of the new
rules is therefore as timely as the purposes which directed its adoption
are commendable. To adhere to the former substantive law and at the
same time incorporate the essentials of "streamlined" practice naturally
constituted a difficult task. Whether or not the adoption of the new rules
terminated this task successfully requires a review of the prior practice
and the effect of the new rules in relation thereto.
As suggested by the committee's explanatory note to Rule 2002, prior
practice in Pennsylvania required that assignors and indemnitees appear
as the nominal party plaintiffs "to the use of" the assignees and subrogees. 8 This type of pleading had its origin in the strict common law
separation of legal and equitable actions. Thus, in actions ex contractu
only the legal parties in interest, having strict legal title or interest, had
a right of action; and the mere equitable or beneficial interests of parties
gave them no right of action. 9 Likewise, in actions ex delicto only the
party whose legal right had been violated could maintain a successful action.1 The apparent injustice to beneficial interests in actions for which
only legal remedies were available led to the grant of permission to those
lteneficially interested to maintain suit in the legal owner's name." This
type of pleading, although modified in many respects by statute,' 2 has
been Pennsylvania practice for years.
The fusion of law and equity under code procedure required adoption of either the legal or equitable rule of determining proper parties.
Quite obviously, the equity rule permitting any party who could show a
material interest, legal or beneficial, to sue was deemed preferable and
was rephrased so as to entitle "real parties in interest" to the right to
bring action.' 8 It is clear that such a provision followed naturally from
the general union of legal and equitable actions, and revolutionary changes,
if any there were, resulted from the fusion of actions rather than from
adoption of the real party in interest rule.' 4
How then is a "real party in interest" provision to work in Pennsylvania, a state which has not as yet seen fit to fuse legal and equitable
actions? It is now the rule that some actions involving beneficial interests
6. See AmRAw, THE NEW FEDERAL RuLEs IN PENNSYLVANIA
7. E. g., see Hanratty v. Dougherty, 71 Pa. Super. 248 (1919).

(1938) § 1O.

8. See Blue Star Nay. Co. v. Emmons Coal Mining Corp., 276 Pa.

352,

356,

i2o

AtI. 459, 460 (923).
9. MARTIN, Crvi PocEouRE AT COMMON LAW (1899) § 181.
io.Id. at § 1g1.
ii. Legh v. Legh, x Bos. & Pul. 447, 126 Eng. Rep. ioo2 (C. P. 1799).
12. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, I93I) tit 12, §§ 142, 143, 149; id. (1939) at tit. 8,
§33; id. (193o) at tit. 56, § ioi, 131.
13. "The true rule undoubtedly is, that which prevails in the courts of equity, that

he who has the right, is the person to pursue the remedy. We have adopted that rule."
N. Y. (1848)124.
14. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING (1928) § 20.
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may be pursuable in actions at law."s Fortunately, equitable defenses have
long been permitted in legal actions in Pennsylvania. 6 Hence, the infusion of real party in interest practice should prove workable in spite of
the fact that legal and equitable actions remain separate. The equity jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts is defined by statute, 7 and it is readily
apparent that the new Pennsylvania rule will not operate to convert actions
formerly tried in equity to actions at law, but will mean only that actions
always pursuable at law will in some instances be altered in style, i. e.,
where beneficial interests were, in effect, previously litigated at law by
naming the party holding the legal interest as nominal plaintiff, now the
party beneficially interested may be named plaintiff without the subterfuge of naming a nominal plaintiff. Thus, although the change will involve problems of difficulty, the real party rule is far from being a revolutionary departure from prior practice.' s
In a state which has long adopted the practice of maintaining legal
and equitable causes of action in the same court, it is rather surprising
that cognizance of the benefits of permitting the party really interested to
sue in his own name has not sooner been given expression. It is but the
substitution of fact for fiction.
ACTIoNs BY "REAL PARTIES

IN INTEREST"

"Except as otherwise provided in clauses (b) and (c) of this
rule, all actions shall be prosecuted by and in the name of the real
party in interest, without distinction between contracts under seal
and parol contracts." '9
Most immediately obvious result of the new real party rule is the
permission finally granted to an assignee, under a valid assignment, to
bring suit in his own name. Under prior practice where a contract was
performed or attempted by the legal plaintiff, who thereafter assigned its
benefits, if any, to another, that other could enforce his rights in law only
by suing in his assignor's name; 20 and the assignee, named "use plaintiff", need not state his rights in the pleadings, or, if stated, need not
prove them at the trial because the entire litigation was between the legal
plaintiff and the defendant. 2' However, the usage was not as harsh as
it might seem because the equitable owner of the chose in action could
15. Note that due to the absence of equity jurisdiction in Pennsylvania for many
years, enforcement of equitable actions in many instances was accomplished through
legal remedies. See Fisher, The Administration of Equity Through Common Law
Forms in Pennsylvania,2 SELECT ESSAYS ix ANGLo-AmERiCAN LEGAL HIsTORY (i9o8)
81o.
16. The case of Swift v. Hawkins, I Dallas 17 (Pa. 1768), is apparently the first
recorded case in which the defendant was permitted to plead an equitable defense, the
court regarding the custom as one of long standing. The plaintiff was early granted
the permission to rebut such a defense. M'Cutchen v. Nigh, io S. & R. 344 (Pa. 1823).
17. PA. CONsT. Art. 5, § 20. See Penn Anthracite Mining Co. v. Anthracite
Miners of Pa., 318 Pa. 401, 410, i78 Atl. 291, 295 (935) ; Lipoff v. United Food Workers Industrial Union, 33 D. & C. 599, 6o7 (1938).
I8. See Amram, The New Procedural Rules, REPORT OF THE FoarY-FIFrT
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE PENNSYLVANIA BAR AssocIATIoN (1939) 56, 65, 66.
ig. Rule 2002, 332 Pa. lxxiii (1939).
2o. Representative of this type of action are Blue Star Nay. Co. v. Emmons Coal
Mining Corp., 276 Pa. 352, i2o Atl. 459 (1923); Guaranty Trust & Safe Deposit Co.
v. Powell, i5o Pa. 16, 24 Atl. 345 (1892).
21. Automobile Securities Co. v. Wilson, 293 Pa. 143, 141 Atl. 849 (1928); Grubnau v. Centennial Nat Bk., 279 Pa. 501, 124 AUt. i42 (1924) ; Howes v. Scott, 224 Pa.
7, 73 Aft. 186 (igog).
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bring the action in the name of the legal plaintiff without express authority
from the latter to do so. 22 Moreover, not only could the court render
judgment against the use assignee, whose interest was not even permitted
to be evidenced, but a defendant recovering an affirmative judgment on
a counterclaim was entitled after suit to have additional parties, not previously 28of record, added as use plaintiffs for the purpose of collecting judgment.

Pennsylvania practitioners will now name the assignee rather than
the assignor to use of assignee as the plaintiff in their statements of claim,
so the argument over proper parties prior to the new rules is more academic than real. However, the rules will effect one very important change
in both pretrial pleadings and trial conduct. Formerly, the right of a use
plaintiff to maintain an action did not depend upon the interest that he
had in the result, but solely on whether the legal plaintiff had a cause of
action,2 4 and the defendant could not object that the legal plaintiff had
assigned his interest in the cause of action.2 5 In complete reverse, the new
rule will require the real party in interest, former use plaintiff, to have
legal capacity to maintain the action.2 6 Similar code pleading provisions
are uniformly construed as putting the validity of the assignment and the
beneficial interest of the assignee in issue.2 7 But what constitutes a valid
assignment remains a question of substantive law as much today as at
prior practice.28 The result is wholly constructive; the party alleging a
beneficial interest in the result is permitted to sue and is precluded from
recovery if he has no substantive right to recover; whereas formerly, the
party alleging a beneficial interest could not sue in his own name, but might
recover in an action by suing in another's name whether he had a right
to recover or not.
It is particularly to be desired that Pennsylvania courts do not fall into
the error of some code courts in holding that the term "real party in interest" means the "party beneficially interested" and exclude plaintiffs with
a legal right of action, but no beneficial interest, from prosecuting an
action. The question arises where an assignment has been made for collection only. Some jurisdictions under a real party in interest provision
have held that, since the assignee has no beneficial interest, he cannot
maintain an action.2 9 It is contended that the better approach is to determine whether or not the transfer gave the transferee a right of action. If
he had such a right before the code provision, he should have one after.
The provision is not intended to change substantive law, but procedure
only; and if a substantive right of action arose, the party in whom it
vested is a real party in interest. Thus, an assignment for collection is
22. The Chambersburg Ins. Co. v. Smith, ii Pa. 120 (1849) (in a similar action
by the beneficiary of a trust) ; see Guaranty Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. Powell, 15o
Pa. I6, I8, 24 Atl. 345 (892).
23. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 12, § 144. Neal v. Buffalo R. & P. Ry.,
1o3 Pa. Super. 218, 158 Atl. 305 (I931). But only where the plaintiff to be added
could have been named originally as a use plaintiff. Blue Ridge Metal Mfg. Co. v.
Proctor, 335 Pa. 354, 6 A. (2d) 811 (1939).
24. See note 21 supra.
25. Birdsall v. Delaware & H. Co., 216 Fed. 717 (M. D. Pa. 1914).
26. See explanatory note, Rule 2002, 332 Pa. lxxiii, lxxv (939).
27. Delaware Co. Commissioners v. Diebold Safe & Lock Co., 133 U. S. 473
(i8go) ; Arkansas Valley Smelting Co. v. Belden Mining Co., 127 U. S. 379 (I888) ;
American Bonding & Trust Co. v. Baltimore & 0. S. W. R. Co., 124 Fed. 866 (C. C.
A. 6th, 19o3).
28. Thomas-Bonner Co. v. Hooven, 0. & R. Co., 284 Fed. 377 (S. D. Ohio, 1920).
29. Moses v. Ingram, 99 Ala. 483, 12 So. 374 (1893) ; Bostwick v. Bryant, 113 Ind.
448, f6 N. E. 378 (i888) ; Brown v. Gina, 66 Ohio St. 316, 64 N. E. 123 (19o2).
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an assignment for value, and the assignee should be permitted to sue as
a real party in interest.8 0
The partial assignee formerly had no standing in a legal or equitable
action unless the debtor had assented to the assignment,81 and this was so
even if the assignee sued in the name of the assignor.82 The Rules Committee has suggested in the explanatory note to Rule 2002 "' that under
real party in interest practice suit will be prosecuted jointly by the partial
assignor and assignee. Such a joint action is a mere procedural arrangement, always permitted in Pennsylvania,834 inasmuch as the assignee,
whether partial or full, always had a substantive right to recover. The
substantive right was basically the right to recover in an action which
could determine the rights of all parties involved, but the code rule has
been interpreted as permitting either the partial assignee or his assignor
to sue alone if no objection is raised, although both should sue.8 5 A similar
rule should follow in Pennsylvania. The partial assignee's claim should
not be defeated by reason of his assignor's refusal to join in a suit within
the statutory period for bringing the action. Since neither the former
substantive law 86 nor the new rules provide a procedure for the assignor's
joinder,87 it follows that the partial assignee should be permitted to sue
alone where he can show a refusal by the assignor to join in the suit.
The provision in Rule 2004 88 for substitution of the assignee as plaintiff where the original plaintiff has assigned his full interest during litigation
and for joinder where the original plaintiff has partially assigned pendente
lite is expressly permissive only. If there is no objection, the action may
continue in the name of the original plaintiff. No longer will Pennsylvania
lawyers be required to mark cases "to use" when assigned during litigation.
This permissive right of substitution or joinder is a common code provision
and, in conformity with the real party rule, is properly construed as giving
the transferee control over the suit and restraining the transferor from
30. The Rupert City, 213 Fed. 263 (D. C. Wash. 1914); Ralph v. Anderson, 187
Cal. 45, 2oo Pac. 940 (1921) ; Manley v. Park, 68 Kan. 400, 75 Pac. 557 (1904) ; see
Hays v. Hathorn, 74 N. Y. 486, 490 (1878) ; cf. McDonald v. Mulkey, 32 Wyo. 144, 231
Pac. 662 (1924), (1925) 23 MicH. L. Ray. 902.
31. Vetter v. Meadville, 236 Pa. 563, 85 Atl. ig (1912) ; Geist's Appeal, 104 Pa.
351 (1883) ; Jernyn v. Moffit, 75 Pa. 399 (1874) ; see Gordon v. Hartford Sterling
Co., 319 Pa. 174, 178, 179 Atl. 234, 236 (935). But see Appeals of the City of Philadelphia, 86 Pa. 179, 182 (878).
Reasons for denying the partial assignee's suit, however, are procedural: "A creditor should not be permitted to split up a single cause of action into many without the
assent of the debtor; to do so subjects the debtor to embarrassments, responsibilities
and multiplicity of suits not contemplated in his original undertaking." Gordon v. Hartford Sterling Co., mspra at 178, 179 Atl. at 236. See note 40 infra.
32. Vetter v. Meadville, 236 Pa. 563, 85 Atl. 19 (1912) (use action); cf. Wells v.
Philadelphia, 270 Pa. 42, 12 AUt. 867 (921).
33. PA. RULES Civ. PaRoc., 332 Pa. lxxiii (939).
34. "Where part of a chose in action has been assigned, the assignor and the assignee may unite in a suit for the enforcement of the chose; the assignor may sue alone,
but the assignee may not sue on it in his own name." Gordon v. Hartford Sterling
Co., 319 Pa. 174, 178, 179 Aft. 234, 236 (1935).
35. Delaware County Commissioners v. Diebold Safe and Lock Co., 133 U. S.473
(1889); Martin v. Howe, 19o Cal. 187, 211 Pac. 453 (1922); Risley v. Phenix Bank
of City of New York, 83 N. Y. 318 (1881); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver
& R. G. R. R., 44 Utah 26, 137 Pac. 653 (1913).
36. However, it might well be argued that the assignor would be estopped by his
conduct from objecting to the prosecution of the suit without his consent. See, e. g.,
McFadden v. May, 325 Pa. 145, 189 Atl. 483 (1937).
37. The new rules simply provide that a party may be compelled to join "when
the substantive law permits such involuntary joinder". PA. RuLEs Cirv. PRoc., Rule
2227 (b), 337 Pa. 5a (940).
38. PA. RuLs CiM. PRoc., 332 Pa. lxxv (1939).
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taking any action inconsistent therewith.39 In the absence of this provision,
substitution would probably not have been permitted, the right being purely
statutory.40 The inclusion therefore is highly commendable, for by the act
of assignment the assignee obtains a substantive right to enforce, thus
becoming the real party in interest. Where the assignor pendente lite dies,
the provision solves the problem of determining who is to continue the suit.
Since the assignor had no real interest following assignment, his estate
could have none, and thus the personal representative would not be the
proper party. There being no Pennsylvania statutory abatement of the
action upon death, it would seem that there would be no objection to continuing the action in the name of the original plaintiff. However, under the
new rule, the assignee may be substituted, become the proper party plaintiff, and thus end all problems.
The substantive law regarding the title to collateral security will determine who the real party in interest is where the owner assigns a chose in
action which is secured. Substantive law prescribes that an unqualified
assignment carries with it as incident thereto all securities held by the
assignor as collateral to the claim, provided the contract of assignment
contains no stipulation to the contrary. 41 Where the security, for example,
is a mortgage, the assignee is a "real party in interest" in a suit to foreclose.42 But, again by substantive law, legal title to the property does not
pass to the assignee by the act of assignment, 3 and hence, the assignee is
not a "real party in interest" in a suit in ejectment," although the mortgagee would have been, title remaining in him. However, the assignee has
the substantive right to sue the assignor in equity for transfer of the title,
and thus become a "real party in interest" in a subsequent action of ejectment. 45 So in every case of determining who the real party in interest is,
the rights of the parties in the eyes of the unchanged substantive law should
determine.
Inasmuch as subrogation is nothing more or less than a compulsory
or equitable assignment, the subrogee's rights as a real party in interest
are not dissimilar to those of an assignee. Thus, while under the prior
practice a subrogee's rights were purely equitable 46 and the subrogee could
only sue in the name of his subrogor at law, 47 now under the new rule one
who pays a loss sustained by another and who is thereby subrogated to
such other's rights against those who occasioned the loss, will be permitted
to sue the latter in his own name. 48 But a question will arise where the
39. Boqua v. Marshall, 88 Ark. 373, 114 S. W. 714 (igo); Harlan Douglas Co.
v. Moncur, I Cal. App. 177, i24 Pac. 1053 (1912) ; King v. Miller, 53 Ore. 53, 97 Pac.

542 (igo8).

4o. Bardach Iron & Steel Co. v. Tenenbaum, 136 Va. 163, 1i8 S. E. 502 (1923).
41. Beaver Trust Co. v. Morgan, 259 Pa. 567, IO3 Atl. 367 (i918); Dubois's Appeal, 38 Pa. 231 (1861) ; Foster v. Fox, 4 W. & S. 92 (Pa. 1842) ; see Morris v. McCulloch, 83 Pa. 34, 38 (1876).
42. See Batchelder v. Jenness, 59 Vt. 104, 107, 7 At. 279, 281 (1887).
43. The assignee is invested with the equitable title only. 6 C. J. S. 1143; 2 R. C.
L. 632; see Luikart v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 129 Neb. 771, 782, 263 N. W.
124, 131 (1935).

44. See Batchelder v. Jenness, 59 Vt. 104, 107, 7 Atl. 279, 281 (1887).
45. See Bailey v. Winn, ioi Mo. 649, 656-657, 12 S. W. 1045, 1046 (i8go).
46. Hay's Estate, 159 Pa. 381, 28 At. 158 (1893) ; Budd v. Olver, 148 Pa. 194, 23
Atl. 1105 (1892) ; PomERoY, EQUITABLE REmEDIES (1905) § 9=, n. 92.
47. Gentile v. P. & t Ry., 274 Pa. 335, 118 At]. 223 (1922) (joint action) ; Mayhugh v. Somerset Tel. Co., 265 Pa. 498, 1O9 Atl. 213 (92O) ; Moltz v. Sherwood Bros.,
Inc., i16 Pa. Super. 231, 176 Atl. 842 (1935) ; see Elkinton v. Newman, 2o Pa. 281, 284

(1853).

48. Explanatory note, Rule 2002, 332 Pa. lxxiii, lxxiv (939) ; Travelers' Ins. Co.
v. Great Lakes Engineering Works Co., 184 Fed. 426 (C. C. A. 6th, 1911); Lord &
Taylor v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 23o N. Y. 132, 129 N. E. 346 (1920); Allen v. Chi-
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loss is greater than the subrogee agreed to indemnify. Thus, where the
loss exceeds the amount of insurance, the insurance company is not a real
party in interest as to the excess, and since the action is indivisible, 9 could
be denied suit except in the name of the insured.50 It is obvious that this
solution is not the proper one; it retains the iniquities of the system which
the new rules were intended to replace. The proper solution is found upon
relation back to the similar assignee's rights. Just as in partial assignments,
a partial subrogee should be permitted to sue in his own name with permission to the defendant to object and have the insured joined. The insurance
company will recover the insurance paid, and the insured will recover the
balance of the loss sustained. 5 1 . The objection to splitting the cause of action
was a mere procedural objection; splitting was never an objection in equity.
Hence, since the rules by their nature change procedure, the fact that they
do make procedural changes should be no objection as long as the substantive law is unaltered.
Tenuous indeed will be the question of whether or not an agent or his
principal will be considered the real party in interest. Continuing the solution on the basis of substantive rights prior to the new rules, it would seem
that since the agent could not sue in his own name 5 2 unless the parol contract was legally his,55 and since substantive changes cannot be properly
contemplated by rules of procedure, the agent will not be considered a real
party in interest because of the rule.5 4 On the other hand, only the agent
had the substantive right to sue on a sealed contract which failed to name
the principal although words of agency appeared.s5 Thus, the principal will
not properly be considered a real party in interest in an action on a deed
in which his name was not mentioned." And yet, without question, it must
be conceded that the only party beneficially interested is the principal. In
the long run, substantive law permitted the principal recovery because of
the right to recover from the agent on the latter's implied promise to turn
over the proceeds of a successful suit. Would it then really be an alteration
of substantive law to permit the principal to recover directly from the third
party rather than indirectly? This might be the more proper view.
The new rule 5 provides, however, as an exception, that "A plaintiff
may sue in his own name . . .when such plaintiff is a person with whom
or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another".
And the general rule is stated to be ". . . without distinction between
contracts under seal and parole contracts". If agents named on sealed
cago & N. W. Ry., g4 Wis. 93, 68 N. W. 873 (1896). But cf. Illinois Cent. Ry. v.
Hicklin, 131 Ky. 624, 115 S.W. 752 (i9o9); Alaska Pac. S. S. Co. v. Sperry Flour
Co., 94 Wash. 227, 162 Pac. 26 (1917).
49. A plaintiff cannot split a cause of action. Fields v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit
Co., 273 Pa. 282, 117 Atl. 59 (1922); Moltz v. Sherwood Bros., 116 Pa. Super. 23,
176 Atl. 842 (1935).
So. See Powell & Powell v. Wake Water Co., 171 N. C. 290, 88 S.E. 426 (I916);
Kansas City, M. & 0. Ry. v. Shutt, 24 Okla. 96, 104 Pac. 51 (igog).
5I. The explanatory note to Rule 2002, 332 Pa. lxxiii, lxxv (1939), states that a
joint suit will be brought- But suppose the insured refuses to join in the action? It
would seem that permission to sue alone with the right to join the others beneficially
interested on proper objection would be a better solution.
52. Gross v. Lundy, 87 Pa. Super. 78 (1925) ; Big Diamond Mills Co. v. Uniontown Baking Co., 5o Pa. C. C. 348 (C.P. Pa. 192I); Commonwealth exr rel. Lanning
v. Wilkes-Barre Gas Co., 6 Kulp 328 (C. P. Pa. i89I).
53. First Nat. Bank of Spring Mills v. Walker, 289 Pa. 252, 137 Atl. 257 (1927).
54. Mitchell v. St. Mary, 148 Ind. I, 47 N. E. 224 (1897) ; Martin & Garrett v.
Mask, I58 N. C. 436, 74 S.E. 343 (1912). Contra: Shirai v. Blum, 239 N. Y. 172, 146
N. E. 194 (1924).

55. Bedford v. Kelly, 6i Pa. 491 (1869) ; Hold v. Martin, 51 Pa. 499 (1866).
56. Schaefer v. Henkel, 75 N. Y. App. 378 (1878).
57. Rule 2002 (b) (2), 332 Pa. lxxiii (i93g).
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contracts are permitted to use this provision as giving them a right of action,
the rule simply restates the former view; they will not be suing as a real
party in interest, but as a party permitted to sue by an exception to the
rule. But if the same argument is permitted where the contracts are merely
parole, a clear abridgment of substantive law results. Some courts under
a similar provision have sustained the validity of the contention,5" regarding
the agent as trustee of an express trust and the principal as cestui thereof.
It is earnestly contended that if the agent has no property in the subject
matter of a contract drawn on behalf of his principal, he should not be
entitled to bring an action thereon.5 9 Of course, if the contract on its face
is a contract between the agent and the third party, the agent had a legal
right to sue before the new rule and should be accorded the right to sue as
a real party in interest subsequent to the new rule.60
Except on contracts under seal without mention of the principal, the
principal may ordinarily sue as a real party in interest; he had the substantive right
prior and has the real right subsequent to the adoption of the new
61
rules.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST RULE

As exceptions to the rule that all actions shall be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest, the new rule provides that a plaintiff
may sue when he is (I) acting in a fiduciary or representative capacity,
(2) when he is a person with whom or in whose name a contract has been
made for the benefit of another, and (3) when a statute or ordinance gives
him a right of action inconsistent with the rule.6 2 From the start it is questionable whether these provisions are really exceptions or are merely explanatory. In the interest of preserving former substantive law unchanged, being unalterable by rules of procedure, a proper interpretation of the real
party rule renders anyone who had a right of action in law or in equity before the new rules a proper real party in interest after. Since those acting in
fiduciary and representative capacities and those acting under a statutory
right had the right to prosecute an action before the adoption of the new
rules of procedure, it would seem that they would have the same right
after, and would properly be called real parties in interest. As has been
stated, restriction of the term "real party in interest" as including only
parties beneficially interested and as excluding parties formerly having a
legal right to recover, would have been vastly to restrict rather than
materially to liberalize pleading. 63 The so-called "exceptions" may be construed as merely stating that the adoption of the real party rule was not
intended to deprive anyone, who formerly had the right to sue, of the right
to prosecute the action.
At common law and in Pennsylvania the trustee, as holder of the legal
title, could without question sue in his own name, nor need he join with him
58. P. N. Gray & Co. v. Cavalliotis, 276 Fed. 565 (E. D. N. Y. 1921); KellyClarke Co. v. Leslie, 61 Cal. App. 558, 215 Pac. 699 (1923) ; Owen v. Harriott, 47 Ind.
App. 359, 94 N. E. 591 (91).
59. Martin & Garrett v. Mask, 158 N. C. 436, 74 S. E. 343 (1912).
6o. Winter v. Lewis, 132 Ark. 399, 200 S. W. 981 (1918) ; King v. Farmers'
Grain Co., 194 Iowa 979, 188 N. W. 720 (1922) ; Higgins v. Sowards, 159 Ky. 783, 169
S. W. 554 (I94).

61. Clubb v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R., 136 Mo. App. I, 117 S. W. no (I9o9);.
Choate v. Stander, 6r Okla. 148, i6o Pac. 737 (1916); First Nat. Life Assur. Soc. of
America v. Farquhar, 75 Wash. 667, 135 Pac. 61g (913). When suit is over a negotiable instrument, the rule is different. N'rOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAWv § IS; Richmond Locomotive & Machine Works v. Moragne, rig Ala. 8o, 24 So. 834 (1898).
62. Rule 2002 (b) , 332 Pa. lxxiii (1939).
63. CLARi, HANDBO0OK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING (1928) § 27.
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the person for whose benefit the action was prosecuted.64 The trustee was
therefore a real party in interest and will be entitled to continue to sue in
his own name under the new rules. 65 The questions arising over similar
code state provisions concerning the meaning of the exception there worded
"trustee of an express trust" were commendably avoided by the drafters
of the Pennsylvania rules by making the exceptions in general terms. Such
an expression of the rule signifies an open road for liberal interpretation,
an interpretation at which code states finally arrived by adding a separate
exception in the same words as the second Pennsylvania exception. It
would seem that it was added to code provisions to liberalize the meaning
of "express trust". This raises the question of the propriety of the second
Pennsylvania exception, which does not include the term. Obviously, the
present rules do not need to include the definition; moreover, the Pennsylvania provision needs no further liberalization. By stating that one who
is acting in a fiduciary capacity may sue alone, the rule covers all types of
trustees and is much more liberal than the comparative code provisions.
However, the interpretation will not be affected-those trustees who had a
right of action before the new rules shall continue to have that right of
action.
Whether or not the beneficiary has a right to sue depends, as in all
cases, on whether or not he had the substantive right to sue before the
adoption of the new rules. Permission granted to the trustee to bring
action should not be considered exclusive; the beneficiary should not be
prevented from suing because of the permission,6" nor should suits by the
beneficiary and the trustee jointly be denied. 67 But in order to sue, the
beneficiary msut be the real party in interest. Since the beneficiary's ordinary remedy substantively is an action to bring his trustee to account, he
usually does not have the right of action where trust property is the subject of litigation, although he is the party really and beneficially interested
in the suit. The rule states that all actions must be prosecuted by the
real party in interest, not that the real party in interest may always bring
an action. The procedural rules committee could not draft provisions
granting a right of action where none existed before. When the beneficiary could sue before the rules, he may now sue as the real party in
interest.
Included also within the general terms of the exceptions to the real
party in interest rule are representative suits by executors and administrators of decedents' estates. As in the case of trustees, it appears that
the personal representative may maintain an action because he has the
legal right to do so and because he is therefore a real party in interest,
and not because the rule states an exception in his behalf. The so-called
"exceptions" are important as before, only in the sense that it makes the
representative's right to sue more certain. The representative is thus entitled to sue on all actions which survive the decedent as a matter of substantive law. Ie may therefore sue under the common law on contracts
generally, for rescission and return of property, and for conversion.6s
Since at common law actions for tort wrongs died with the decedent, the
representative's right to sue for damages for such wrongs is purely statutory. In Pennsylvania executors and administrators have the power to
commence and prosecute all actions which the decedent whom they rep64. Appeal of Aultman, 98 Pa. 505 (1881).
65. By the express provision of Rule 2002, 332 Pa. lxxiii (1939).

66. Hubbell v. Medbury, 53 N. Y. 98 (1873).

67. Permitted in Citizens Trust Co. v. Tindle, 272 Mo. 68i, 199 S. W. 1025 (917);

Gulbranson-Dickinson Co. v. Hopkins, 170 Wis. 326, 175 N. W. 93 (igig).
68. MECHEM AND ATKINs0N, WILLS AiD AD INISTRATION (1939) 641.

NOTES

resent might have commenced and prosecuted, except actions for libel and
slander; 69 and the power to prosecute to judgment any action commenced
by the decedent during his life.70 Although the beneficiaries of the estate
in cases involving realty and the estate in cases involving personalty are
substantively the parties beneficially interested, the law denominates the
personal representative the proper party to bring action, and the real
party rule simply restates the prior practice. The recovery being to the
estate, the proceeds are subject to the claims of creditors and administrative expenses.
CONCLUSION

The new real party in interest rule under any viewpoint is a step in
a direction which can only be said to be progressive. Interpretation of
the rule in the litigation to follow should be based on a realization of the
distinction, between real parties in interest and parties beneficially interested-the two are often not synonymous-and a realization of the distinction between substantive and procedural changes--only the latter and not
the former being intended. In this respect, Pennsylvania is fortunate in
having a wealth of attempted solutions by courts of code pleading states
under similar provisions; their success and failures, in short, the net result of their decisions, should eliminate many difficulties which might
otherwise be encountered. The courts should construe the new rules liberally with a view toward an intent to eliminate useless pleadings and to
simplify practice in conformity with modem requirements for the convenience of the lawyers and the courts.
J.L.S.

Trustee's Duty to Convert Non-Legal Securities Held by Settlor
The shrinkage in the value of securities since 1929 has caused corresponding losses to trust estates. This has led beneficiaries, whose income has been reduced, to attempt to transfer the loss to the trustees by
surcharging them for mismanagement of various sorts, one of which has
been the improper retention of securities. The trustee, on the other hand,
often desires to continue investments of the settlor, because the income
from such securities will often be greater than the low rate of interest
that can be obtained on legal investments. It is, therefore, of utmost importance to determine whether or not a trustee must convert non-legal
securities received in kind from the settlor and how long he is permitted to
retain these non-legals before complying with any duty to convert. There
are a few instances, however, in which the question of a duty to convert
or retain non-legals does not arise. In some states investments for trust
funds are not regulated,' and consequently a trustee can retain any investment made by the settlor,' unless he fails to exercise the prudence and
discretion which men use in the management of their own affairs.3 Other
69. PA. STAT. Aim. (Purdon, Supp. Ig4o) tit. 20, § 772.
70. Id. at § 771.
i. McCoy v. Horwitz, 62 Md. 183 (1884); Brown v. French, 125 Mass. 410
(1878) ; see Peckham v. Newton, 15 R. I. 321, 322, 4 At. 758, 759 (886) ; Scoville v.
Brock, 8i Vt. 405, 419, 7o Atl. ioi4, io2o (I9O8). 5 MIcH. CoMP. LA-ws (Mason's
Cum. Supp., 1940) § 12993-Il.
2. Creed v. McAleer, 275 Mass. 353, 175 N. E. 761 (93); Peckham v. Newton,
15 P. I. 321, 4 Atl. 758 (1886) ; Scoville v. Brock, 81 Vt 405, 70 At. 1014 (1908).
3. Michigan Home Missionary Society v. Coming, 164 Mich. 395, 129 N. W. 686
(1911) ; see Creed v. McAleer, 257 Mass. 353, 357, 175 N. E. 761, 762 (1931).
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states have statutes which prescribe the kind of securities in which trust
funds may be invested but have added provisions permitting all trustees, 4 or at least trust companies,5 to retain securities which were received
from the settlor. Of course, even in this situation the fiduciary will be
liable, if he fails to exercise reasonable prudence in so doing,6 the same
as if he negligently retains, legal investments.7 Also the fiduciary need
not convert non-legals where the trust deed grants him the power to retain unauthorized securities, 8 unless, under the circumstances, prudence
requires their conversion. 9 Finally, even though the trustee may be under
a duty to dispose of unapproved investments, he may be relieved of liability for failure to do so, if there is express or implied consent to the
retention by all the beneficiaries, providing they are all sui juris and fully

informed.10

THE GENERAL RULE

In jurisdictions which limit the investment of trust funds, absent
any provision in the statute or trust instrument permitting retention, the

rule is generally settled that "the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary within a reasonable time after the creation of the trust to dispose
of any part of the trust property included in the trust at the time of its
creation which would not be a proper investment for the trustee to
make." "1

Whereas a trustee is under a duty to exercise ordinary prudence
in managing approved securities, 1 2 he is under the greater obligation with
4. 2 CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §4837; DEL. REV. CODE ('935) c. 117, §35 (D);
I Fla. Laws 1937, c. I7949, § 4 (A); IL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 3, 1144; IOWA
CODE (1939) § 12772.2 (with court's consent) ; 6 LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart, 1939)
§ 985o.65; Me. Laws 1937, c. 145; Neb. Laws 1933, c. 64, § 2; 3 N. J. STAT. ANN.
(1939) 3:16-12; N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW §iII (6); OIo CODE: ANN. (Baldwin's
Throckmorton, 1940) § 1o50&42; 3 S. C. CIv. CODE (I932) § go5i; W. Va. Acts 1939,
c. 101; WIs. STAT. (1939) 320.05 (with court's consent).
5. 1 CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) Act 652, § 105; 2 MINN. STAT. (Mason,
1927) § 7735; 5 OR. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1935) § 22-1214; 5 WASH. REv. STAT. ANN.
(Remington, 1932) § 3255 (m).
6. In re Ward, 121 N. J. Eq. 6o6, 191 At. 772 (1937). Most statutes expressly
permit retention only so long as the fiduciary exercises prudence in the retention.
7. In re Carlson, 162 Wash. 20, 297 Pac. 764 (1931) ; Will of Church, 221 Wis.
472, 266
TRUSTS

N. W. 210 (1936). RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 231; 2 ScoTr, LAW OF
(I939) § 231; Note (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 640, 641; Notes (1932) 77
A. L. R. 505, (1938) 112 A. L. R. 355.
8. Matter of Clark, 257 N. Y. 132, 177 N. E. 397 (193I); Chemical Bank & Trust
Co. v. Reynaud, i5o Misc. 821, 27o N. Y. Supp. 301 (Sup. Ct. 1933) ; Gardner's Estate,
323 Pa. 229, x85 Atl. 804 (1936) ; Dickinson's Estate, 318 Pa. 561, 179 Atl. 443 (935);
Bartol's Estate, 182 Pa. 407, 38 AtI. 527 (1897).

9. Matter of Garland, 159 Misc. 333, 287 N. Y. Supp. 918 (Surr. Ct. 1936); see

Wild v. Brown, i2o N. J.Eq. 31, 33, 183 At. 899, 9oo (Ch. 1936) ; Dickinson's Estate,
318 Pa. 561, 563, 179 At. 443, 444 (I935).

io. Matter of Kern, 159 Misc. 682, 288 N. Y. Supp. 655 (Surr. Ct. 1936) ; Curran's Estate, 312 Pa. 416, 167 At. 597 (1933) ; see Clabby's Estate, 338 Pa. 3o5, 312,
12 A. (2d) 71, 74 (I94O).
But see Zoob, Exceptions to the Liability of Trustees
(935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 726.
ii. RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 230. Clark v. Clark, 167 Ga. i, 144 S.E. 787
1928) Cameron Trust Co. v. Leibrandt, 229 Mo. App. 450, 83 S. W. (2d) 234
(i935); Matter of Baker, 249 App. Div. 265, 292 N. Y. Supp. 122 (4th Dep't 1936)
(now there is a N. Y. statute contra, see note 4 supra) ; Seamans' Estate, 333 Pa. 358,
5 A. (2d) 2o8 (1939)

(guardian) ; Taylor's Estate, 277 Pa. 518, 121 At. 3io (1923);

Estate of George, 225 Wis. 251, 27o N. W. 538 (1936) (there is. now a Wis. statute
contra, see note 4 supra). 3 BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 686;
PERRY, TREATISE ON THE LAW or TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (9th ed. 1929) § 465; 2 ScoTr,
LAW OF TRUSTS (939) §230; Notes (1925) 37 A. L. R. 559, (1939) 122 A. L. R. 8oi.
See also IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, 1936) § 791o, requiring conversion in one year.
12. Exchange Trust Co. v. Doudera, 270 Mass. 227, 17o N. E. 73 (193o); Kline's
Estate, 28o Pa. 41, m4 AtI. 280 (1924).

RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 174.
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respect to unauthorized securities in that he must exercise ordinary prudence in carrying out a duty to convert such non-legals within a reasonable time.13 In other words he must act, not merely as a reasonable man,
but as a prudent trustee.' 4 In failing to convert securities which could
have been sold, he must show, not only that it was prudent to retain, but
that a prudent man who was going to convert in a reasonable time would,
nevertheless, have refrained from selling at that time.' 5 As long as he
exercises the required skill and caution, he may retain
legal investments
6
forever, but non-legals only for a reasonable time.'
Some of the early courts, refusing to surcharge for retention of nonlegals, based their decision on the fact that the trustee had exercised common prudence,' 7 thus failing to express the distinction between legal and
non-legal securities. However, the later cases have generally recognized
the added duty of conversion,' 8 thus clearing up the previous uncertainty.
Certain courts have recognized the duty to convert but added that the
fiduciary should not be liable where "he shows that his retention of the
securities in question represents, not a mere lack of attention, but the
honest exercise of judgment based on actual considerations of existing conditions"." That a fiduciary may retain non-legals in exceptional circumstances has been called by Bogert a qualified duty to convert. 20 He states
that it is not always clear whether the courts, in refusing to surcharge, base
their decision on the existence of exceptional circumstances or on the fact
that the fiduciary has not had a reasonable time to convert, under the existing conditions. 21 It is submitted that this so-called qualified duty to convert
is not inconsistent with the general rule but is merely an application of it
to exceptional circumstances and that under those circumstances a reasonable time had not elapsed.
THE PENNSYLVANIA RULE

The Pennsylvania courts have not always stated the duty to convert
unauthorized securities clearly. The early cases placed Pennsylvania with
the states which failed to express a difference between legals and nonlegals, 22 but more recent cases bring Pennsylvania in line with the general
13. Seamans' Estate, 333 Pa. 358, 362, 5 A. (2d) 208, 211 (1939) (guardian);
Taylor's Estate, 277 Pa. 518, 529, 121 AtI. 310, 313 (1923).
14. Berges' Estate, 3o D. & C. 549, 554 (Pa. 0. Ct 1937); Estate of Allis, 191
Wis. 23, 209 N. W. 945 (1926).
15. Taylor's Estate, 277 Pa. SiS, 121 Atl. 31o (1923).
I6. Clark v. Clark, 167 Ga. 1, 144 S. E. 787 (1928); Matter of Baker, 249 App.
Div. 265, 292 N. Y. Supp. 122 (4th Dep't 1936) ; Matter of Yung, 103 Misc. 358, 170
N. Y. Supp. 303 (Surr. Ct. 1918) ; Seamans' Estate, 333 Pa. 358, 5 A. (2d) 208 (I939)
(guardian).
17. Jones v. Jones, 2 N. Y. Supp. 844 (Sup. Ct. 1888) ; Coggins' Appeal, 3 Walker
426 (Pa. i8I). Note (I93O) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 77.
x8. See Matter of Parsons, 143 Misc. 368, 371, 257 N. Y. Supp. 339, 343 (Surr.
Ct. 1932). See note ii supra.
19. Taylor's Estate, 277 Pa. 518, 528, 12r Atl. 310, 313 (1923) ; Clark v. Clark,
167 Ga. 1, 44 S. E. 787 (1928) ; Matter of Baker, 249 App. Div. 265, 292 N. Y. Supp.
122 (4th Dep't 1936) ; see Guaranty Trust Co. v. Lewis, 279 N. Y. 396, 4oo, i8 N. E.
(2d) 635, 637 (i939) ; Nola's Estate, 333 Pa. io6, 109, 3 A. (2d) 326, 328 (i939).
20. 3 BoERr, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (935)
§ 686; Bogert, The Trustee's
Duty with Regard to Conversion of Investments (933) 1 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 28, 32.
2r. Bogert, The Trustee's Duty with Regard to Conversion of Investments (1933)
I U.

OF

CH. L. REV. 28, 34.

Coggins' Appeal, 3 Walker 426 (Pa. 188) ;see Calhoun's Estate, 6 Watts 185
(Pa. 1837) (executor).
22.
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rule. 3 Occasionally this rule has been expressed as a qualified duty to
convert,2 4 but as mentioned before, this is not necessarily inconsistent with
the general rule. From time to time the courts have added doubt to the
issue by stating that the duty of a trustee is "to be ordinarily watchful and
to exercise normally good judgment." 25 However, when such language is
read with the whole case in which it appears, it seems to refer to the standard of2 8care which the trustee is expected to exercise in converting non-

legals.

The situation in Pennsylvania was further complicated by the passage

in 191I of a statute declaring that a fiduciary should use reasonable diligence
in converting non-legal securities received in kind.2 7 The effect of this
statute, however, was rather anomalous, because the courts have consistently ignored it and have found a duty to convert independent of it. In
only two cases, both within the last two years, has the statutory duty been
mentioned.28
In spite of this, however, or perhaps because of it, the portion of this
statute which related to the duty of converting non-legals was repealed in
1937.29

The question then arose as to whether or not the duty remained.

The question is still a moot one today, since no cases have come up under
it-the 1937 legislation not being retroactive.30 However, the question
appears to require an affirmative answer. The latest Pennsylvania cases
unequivocally state that a trustee is under a duty to convert unauthorized
securities within a reasonable time.2 ' In view of the policy of the statute
limiting trust funds-namely protecting the corpus of the estate 8 2 -and of
the cases in Pennsylvania and other jurisdictions8 3 which were decided
without relying on any statute, it would seem that the 1911 statute merely
23. Casani's Estate, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Aug. 6, 1940, p. 1, col. 3 (Pa. 0.
Ct 1940), 89 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 23o; Seamans' Estate, 333 Pa. 358, 5 A. (2d) 208
(939) (guardian); Taylor's Estate, 277 Pa. 518, 121 Atl. 310 (1923); see Shipley's

Estate (No. 1), 337 Pa. 571, 573, 12 A. (2d) 343, 344 (940).
24. Reinhard's Estate, 322 Pa. 325, 185 Atl. 298 (1936) ; Taylor's Estate, 277 Pa.
518, 221 At. 320 (1923); see Nola's Estate, 333 Pa. io6, 2O9, 3 A. (2d) 326, 328
(1939) ; Brown's Estate, 287 Pa. 499, 502, 135 Atd. 112, 1I3 (1926).
25. Taylor's Estate, 277 Pa. 518, 528, 12 Atl. 310, 323 (1923) ; Dempster's Estate,
308 Pa. 253, i6o, 162 Atl. 447, 449 (1932) ; Reinhard's Estate, 322 Pa. 325,328, 185 Atl.
298, 300 (1936).

26. The language of a case can be interpreted only in conjunction with its facts.
An executor's duties are to wind up and distribute the estate. RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS
(2935) § 6, comment b. By the very nature of his office, he must convert non-legals.
Talk of prudence in executor cases must be considered in connection with this inherent
duty. Thus the following, which are executor cases, are not in point: Shipley's Estate

(No. I), 337 Pa. 571, 12 A. (2d) 343 (1940); Gardner's Estate, 323 Pa. 229, 185 Atl.

804 (1936); Brown's Estate, 287 Pa. 499, 135 Atl. 122

(1926);

Borell's Estate, 256

Pa. 523, IOO Atl. 953 (2917) ; Dauler's Estate, 247 Pa. 356, 93 Atl. 51 (915) ; Webb's
Estate, 165 Pa. 330, 3o At. 827 (895); Stewart's Appeal, iio Pa. 41o, 6 Atl. 322

(i885) ; Neff's Appeal, 57 Pa. 91 (1868); Calhoun's Estate, 6 Watts i85 (Pa. 1837).
Where a trustee has a power to retain, the extent of his duty is to exercise common prudence. See notes 8 and 9 supra. In the following cases the trustee has a power
to retain, so the statement of the trustee's duty cannot be applied to an ordinary trus-

tee: Clabby's Estate, 338 Pa. 305, 12 A. (2d) 71 (i94o) ; Dempster's Estate, 3o8 Pa.
,53, 162 Atl. 447 (1932) (guardian) ; Bartol's Estate, 182 Pa. 407, 38 Atl. 527 (I897).
27. 1921 P. L. 870, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i93o) tit. 20, § 866.
28. Seamans' Estate, 333 Pa. 358, 363, n. 3, 5 A. (2d) 208, 211, rL 3 (939) ; Casani's Estate, 37 D. & C. 182 (Pa. 0. Ct 1940).
29. 1937 P. L. 1037, PA. STAT. ANx. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 20, § 866.
30. See Seamans' Estate, 333 Pa. 358, 36 3n., 5 A. (2d) 208, 21in. (939).
31. Casani's Estate, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Aug. 6, 1940, p. I, col. 3 (Pa. 0.
Ct. i94o) ; Seamans' Estate, 333 Pa. 358, 5 A. (2d) 2o8 (2939) (guardian).
32. Note (2936) 86 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 64o, 642-2. See discussion p. 233 infra, and

notes 6o-63 infra.
33. See note ii supra.
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codified a common law duty. The repeal of such a statute, without more,
would not thereby nullify the duty.34 Nevertheless, it is difficult to see why
the legislature made this change unless they intended to terminate this duty,
but if this was their intention, it is as hard to understand why they did not
expressly state this. Therefore, it seems safe to say that the rule laid down
in Seanans' Estate will remain the rule in Pennsylvania.
THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING A REASONABLE TIME

Once the duty to convert within a reasonable time has been established,
it becomes necessary to determine what constitutes a reasonable time, a
question which depends on the peculiar facts of the individual case,35 judged
at the time the trustee received the securities, not in the light of subsequent
events.36
The courts have said that the trustee should convert promptly, but not
under the whip of the law, without regard to the effect of existing market
conditions on the value that may be realized from the sale.87 The law does
not require an immediate sale which sacrifices the assets of the trust estate. 38
Indeed "the trustee might be held liable for loss if he sold when the market
was low and there was a subsequent recovery." 89 The fact that there was

no market,40 or only a limited market,41 or that the securities could not be
sold without too great a sacrifice 42 have been held determining factors in
defining a reasonable time. The courts tend to treat with favor those who
34. Estate of Sloan, 7 Cal. App. (2d) 319, 46 P. (2d) 1007 (1935) ; Reeves & Co.
v. Russell, 28 N. D. 2 3 5 , 148 N. W. 654 (1914); Harper v. Building Association, 55
W. Va. 149, 46 S. E. 817 (1904).
35. Matter of Morris, 153 Misc. 9D5, 276 N. Y. Supp. 254 (Surr. Ct. 1934) ; Matter of Parsons, 143 Misc. 368, 257 N. Y. Supp. 339 (Surr. Ct. 1932) ; Casani's Estate,
Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Aug. 6, 1940, p. I, col. 3 (Pa. 0. Ct. 1940) ; Taylor's Estate,
277 Pa. 518, 121 Atl 310 (1923). RESTATExMT, TRUSTS (935) § 230, comment b.
36. Cox v. Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 124 N. J. Eq. 490, 2 A. (2d) 473
(Ch. 1938); Matter of Clark, 257 N. Y. 132, 177 N. E. 397 (i93i) ; Clabby's Estate,
338 Pa. 305, 12 A. (2d) 71 (1940).
37. Clark v. Clark, 167 Ga. I, 144 S. E. 787 (1928) ; Matter of Baker, 249 App.
Div. 265, 292 N. Y. Supp. 122 (4th Dep't 1936) ; Matter of Wotton, 59 App. Div. 584,
69 N. Y. Supp. 753 (ist Dep't i9oi) ; Seamans' Estate, 333 Pa. 358, 5 A. (2d) 2o8
(1939).
38. Beam v. Paterson Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 83 N. 3. Eq. 628, 92 Atl. 351
(914) ; Casani's Estate, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Aug. 6, 1940, p. 1, col. 3 (Pa. 0.
Ct. 194o); see Clabby's Estate, 338 Pa. 305, 314, 12 A. (2d) 71, 75 (1940); Seamans'
Estate, 333 Pa. 358, 364, 5 A. (2d) 208, 212 (I939) ; Nola's Estate, 333 Pa. io6, log,
3 A. (2d) 326, 328 (1939). RE-STATEE T, TRUSTS (1935) § 230, comment b.
In Brown's Estate, 287 Pa. 499, 502, 135 AtI. 112, 113 (1926), the court said,
"They need not rush into a conversion of the securities left by the decedent and, under
the whip of the law, sell them below what they might normally expect to receive for
them, thus causing an estate to shrink out of all proportion to any possible benefit that
might arise through a strict application of the rule." Perhaps the harm to the individual estate should be balanced against the long-run benefits to be derived from the
rule, in ascertaining how strictly to apply it.
39. Beam v. Paterson Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 83 N. J. Eq. 628, 630, 92 Atl. 351
(1914). See Coggins' Appeal, 3 Walker 426, 445 (Pa. 1881).
40. Beam v. Paterson Safe Deposit & Trust CO., 83 N. J. Eq. 628, 92 Atl. 351
(1914) ; Reinhard's Estate, 322 Pa. 325, 185 Atl. 298 (1936) ; see Seamans' Estate, 333
Pa. 358, 364, 5 A. (2d) 208, 212 (939).
41. O'Brien's Estate, 18 D. & C. 501 (Pa. 0. Ct. 1933); see Seamans' Estate, 333
Pa. 358, 364, 5 A. (2d) 208, 212 (1939).
42. Casani's Estate, Phila. Intelligencer, Aug. 6, 1940, p. r, col. 3 (Pa. 0. Ct.
i94o) ; see Seamans' Estate, 333 Pa. 358, 364, 5 A. (2d) 208, 212 (1939). RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 23o, comment b.
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in good faith and judgment administer estates; and it is submitted that
so long as a trustee decides, in good faith and with reasonable prudence, to
convert or retain, while recognizing his duty to convert within a reasonable
time, he should be exempt from liability; that only when he determines to
hold them as good investments, without regard to his duty to convert as
soon as reasonable, should he be surcharged.4
It is the determination of a reasonable time in a depressed market
that -has given the courts trouble recently. Bogert predicted that the
courts would be lenient in dealing with trustees in the current depression; but in Seamans' Estate," a 1939 case holding liable a negligent
guardian, the court surcharged for loss commencing one year from the
date of receiving the securities, saying, "This grants him all the time for
conversion to which even the unusual conditions then prevailing entitled
him." 47 The one year period was fixed by analogy to the time given
personal representatives in England."' This analogy appears to be of little weight, since the duties of a personal representative are to wind up and
distribute the estate,49 whereas those of a trustee are the more permanent
ones of managing the estate over a more extended period.5 ° In Coggins'
Appeal," decided in I88I, the court was lenient with a trustee in depression times and, in speaking of a retention of non-legals for over eight years,
said, "no one could have foreseen in 1873, the decline which afterwards
took place in some of the stocks; and after the decline had fairly set in,
the accountant might justly have been chargeable with folly or worse if
he had sold more than he could help at what would have been a ruinous
sacrifice." 52 It would seem more rational to agree with the dissent in
Seamans' Estate, that no prudent man would have sold non-legals at such
a sacrifice.5 s Indeed this is the view taken by the same court in dictum in
4
two cases 5 subsequent to Seamans' Estate. In the latest case on the subject, 59 the orphans' court of Philadelphia County en banc held that in retaining non-legals since 1930, the trustee did not violate his duty of con43. See Matter of Stunmpp, 153 Misc. 92, 105, 274 N. Y. Supp. 466, 479 (Surr. Ct

1934) ; Coggins' Appeal, 3 Walker 426, 443 (Pa. i88i); Calhoun's Estate, 6 Watts
185, 189 (Pa. 1837).

44. That prudence and good faith divorced from the recognition of a duty to convert within a reasonable time are not sufficient, see Matter of Yung, 103 Misc. 358, 170
N. Y. Supp. 303 (Surr. Ct. i918) ; Seamans' Estate, 333 Pa. 358, 5 A. (2d) 208 (939).
45. 3 BOGEsRT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (I935) § 686; Bogert, The Trustee's
Duty with Regard to Conversiont of Investments (1933) I U. OF CHI..L. REV. 28, 48.
46. 333 Pa. 358, 5 A. (2d) 208 (1939).
47. Id. at 366, 5 A. (2d) at 213. The Pennsylvania court was not alone in adopting
the rule that a trustee must convert in one year. Estate of George, 225 Wis. 252, 270
N. W. 538 (936).
48. In a footnote to Seamans' Estate on p. 363, 5 A. (2d) at 211, the court quotes
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (935)
§ 230, comment b, which only says that one year might
or might not be reasonable. The court also cites Hughes v. Empson, 22 Beav. 18I, 52
Eng. Rep. R. 2077 (1856), which surcharges an executor for losses after a twelve
month period. See Casani's Estate, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Aug. 6, 1940, p. I, col. 3
(Pa. 0. Ct. I94o).
49. See Matter of Kohler, 231 N. Y. 353, 365, 132 N. E. 114, 117 (192) ; RESTATEMlENT, TRUSTS (935) § 6, comment b; i Scorr, LAW OF TRUSTS (1939) § 6.

50. See Casani's Estate, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Aug. 6, 1940, p. I, col. 3 (Pa.
0. Ct. 1940) ; Taylor's Estate, 277 Pa. 5,8, 526, 121 Atl. 310, 312 (1923) ; BOGmR, LAW
oF TRUSTS (1921) § iib.
51. 3 Walker 426 (Pa. i88i).
52. Id. at 445.
53. 333 Pa. 368, 5 A. (2d) 213 (2939).
54. See Shipley's Estate (No. i), 337 Pa. 571, 578, 12 A. (2d) 343, 346 (I94);
Clabby's Estate, 338 Pa. 305, 314, 12 A. (2d) 71, 75 (194o).

55. Casani's Estate, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Aug. 6, 1940, p. x, col. 3 (Pa. 0.

Ct i94o), 89 U. OF PA. L. REV. 23o.

NOTES

verting within a reasonable time. It does not appear to be expedient to
limit arbitrarily a reasonable time to a certain number of months."
The court may find it easy to determine whether or not non-legals
have in the past been converted within a reasonable time, but a trustee
who desires to know whether or not he must sell at any given moment
may encounter difficulties. Although he may apply to the court for direction,57 this involves time and expense, and there is no assurance that the
directions will be given. 8 As long as the trustee must convert, it might
be advisable for the legislature to specify the time within which he must
perform his duty, as has been done by the Indiana legislature,59 and to
provide that, in exceptional circumstances, where conversion within that
time would cause a sacrifice of the trust assets, the trustee might be authorized to obtain the permission of the court to retain the non-legal securities
for a longer time. This would relieve the trustee of liability where heretofore he was surcharged for mistaking, in good faith, the strictness of
his duty.
CONCLUSION

The object of the statutes regulating trust investments is to confine
such investments to safe securities, conserving the principal, 0 even though
the current income is thereby reduced, 61 thus protecting the remainderman 62 at the possible expense of the life tenant. It is as important to
convert these non-legals as to prohibit investment in them in the first place,
since the risk of loss is equal in either case.6 3 It may not be presumed
that the settlor intended his investments to be continued, for, although
he may speculate with his own funds, a trustee may not speculate with
the funds of the trust estate.6 4 Nor does it follow that a man with faith
in a business that he is managing will have the same confidence in the
business under other management.6 5 As long as investments for trust
funds are regulated, the duty to convert non-legals received in kind seems
certain.
56. '

.

. the court expressly disclaims any ability as a fortune teller, and there-

fore declines to accept the invitation to predict the precise moment when the general
pertinent conditions will have reached a stage such as to make the retention of the investments in question no longer a prudent act." Matter of Storts, 142 Misc. 54, 56, 253
N. Y. Supp. 834, 837 (Surr. Ct. 1931).

"The trustees are held to a diligent protection of the estate, and such exercise of
judgment in the present condition of the market should not be marked arbitrarily by
months." Matter of Watson, I45 Misc. 425, 261 N. Y. Supp. 327 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
57. 1937 P. L. 1037, § 4, PA. STAT. Axx. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) § 866.
58. See Rebmann's Estate, 338 Pa. 120, 12 A. (2d) 350 (1940). Apparently other
state courts will give such instructions. Beardsley v. Bridgeport Protestant Orphan
Asylum, 76 Conn. 560, 57 At]. 165 (19o4) ; Brown v. Brown, 72 N. J. Eq. 667, 65 Atl.
739 (Ch. 1907) ; Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Copeland, 39 R. I. 193, 98 Atl.
273 (i z6) ; Will of Leitsch, 185 Wis. 257, 201 N. W. 284 (1924).
59. IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, 1934) § 7910.
60. See In re Buhl's Estate, 211 Mich. 124, 131, 178 N. W. 65i, 654 (1920) ; Industrial Trust Co. v. Parks, 57 R. I. 363, 373, 19o At. 32, 37 (i937) ; Note (1936) 84
U. OF PA. L. REv. 64o, 641-2.
61. See Brown's Estate, 287 Pa. 499, 502, 135 Atl. 112, 113 (1926).
62. See Industrial Trust Co. v. Parks, 57 R.I. 363, 373, i9o Atl. 32, 37 (1937);
Will of Leitsch, 185 Wis. 257, 264, 2O1 N. W. 284, 286 (1924).
63. 3 BoGEaT, LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs (1935) § 686; Bogert, The Trustee's
Duty with Regard to Conversion of Investments (1933) I U. OF CHL.L. REV. 28, 31.
64. See Wild v. Brown, 12o N. J. Eq. 31, 33, 183 At. 8&A, go (Ch. 1936) ; King
v. Talbot, 4o N. Y. 76, 86; Hart's Estate (No. i), 203 Pa. 480, 484, 53 Atl. 364, 366
(9o2) ; Will of Leitsch, 185 Wis. 257, 266, 2O N. W. 284, 287 (1924).
65. See Will of Leitsch, 185 Wis. 257, 266, 2Ol N. W. 284, 287 (1924).
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There is a present tendency to favor the life tenant of a trust as against
the previously favored remainderman. 66 It is said that the settlor intended
primarily to benefit the life tenant, and only secondarily the remainderman. 67 One manifestation of this tendency is the recent passage in many
states of statutes permitting trustees or trust companies to retain unau-

thorized securities received from the settlor. 6 If it is felt desirable to allow
such retention because the securities held by the settlor are usually good
investments for trust funds, this should be accomplished by broadening
the list of legal investments for trust funds to include safe stocks and the
like, a change that would have to be effected by the legislature rather than
the courts.
E.M.D.
66. See Levy's Estate, 333 Pa. 44o, 4 5 A. (2d) 98, 99 (1939). See also Nirdlinger's Estate (No. 2), 327 Pa. 171, 193 Atl. 30 (937), (1936) 85 U. oF PA. L. Ray.
126, (1937) 86 U. oF PA. L. Rav. iog, which, although it was a case of first impression,
overruled the general prevailing practice.
67. See Nirdlinger's Estate, 331 Pa. 135, 138, 2o0 At. 656, 657 (1938). Also see
(1936) 85 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 126.
68. Since I93o Delaware, Florida, Maine, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin have passed such acts. See notes 4 and 5 suPra.

